DEALBREAKER

Obama's words were pure spin—there had been no Senate vote in favor of the agreement, or debate over the merits of the bill. The JCPOA survived not because the American Congress supported it, but because parliamentary procedures precluded it from being killed.

– Page 239

"I've heard lots of people say, 'we're going to rip up the deal,'" Trump said. "It's very tough to do when you say, 'Rip up a deal.'" The New york businessman then unveiled his transactional approach toward resolving the Iran nuclear issue. "You know, I've taken over some bad contracts. I buy contracts where people screwed up and they have bad contracts," he said. "But I'm really good at looking at a contract and finding things within a contract that, even if they're bad, I would police that contract so tough that they don't have a chance. As bad as the contract is, I would be so tough on that contract."

Trump continued this theme on September 4, 2015, calling in to the MSNBC "Morning Joe" program.

"I have to do what's right," Trump said. "Politically and certainly for the nomination, I would love to tell you I'm going to rip up this contract, I'm going to be the toughest guy in the world, and I'm just rippin' it up, but you know what? Life doesn't work that way."

– Page 239

But you see here's the catch. Under this deal, if Iran doesn't change its behavior, in fact, if it becomes even more dangerous in the years to come, the most important constraints will still be automatically lifted by year 10 and by year 15. That would place a militant Islamic terror regime weeks away from having the fissile material for an entire arsenal of nuclear bombs.

– Page 240

Israel had long viewed the Iranian nuclear program as representing an existential threat to the security of the Jewish state. In 1995, Benjamin Netanyahu, who at the time headed the conservative Lijud Party and was positioning himself for the 1996 elections for Prime Minister, authored a book, Fighting Teorrorism, in which he positied that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose a threat to the entire world. Iran, Netanyahu opined, was but "a short time" away from acquiring the materials , infrastructure, and know-how to perfect an indigenous uranium enrichment capability. Once this was accomplished, Netanyahu wrote, "It would then be a matter of five to seven years" before Iran would have a nuclear weapon.

In May 1996, Netanyahu was elected Prime Minister. Soon afterwards he was provided with a report prepared by Amos Gilad, a senior intelligence officer in the Israel Military Intelligence service, or AMAN, which assessed "that iran would become Israel's main enemy because of its vision of developing botha nuclear weapon and a large missile force."

In July 1996, Netanyahu addressed a joint session of the US Congress, where he warned the American lawmakers about the consequences of a nuclear Iran, which he labeled "the most dangerous" regime. "If this regime were to acquire nuclear weapons," the new Israeli Prime Minister warned, "this could presage catastropic consequences, not only for my country, and not only for the Middle East, but for all mankind." Under Netanyahu, Israel was trying to get the US to buy into their assessment that Iran was pursiung a nuclear weapons capability that, when paired with a parallel program for the development of long-range missiles, placed all of Israel, and the world, in dnager. The United States, however, was preoccupied with Iraq and the unresolved issue Of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. When it came to the alleged nuclear threat posed by Iran, Israel was on its own.

Netanyahu struggled as Prime Minister and, after losing a vote of no confidence, was compelled to call for early elections in May 1999. Ehud Barak, the former Minister of Defense, won, and in turn was ousted in 2001 by Ariel Sharon, another former Minister of Defense. Sharon had inherited the services of Efraim Halevy, the director of Mossad who was appointed to that position by Netanyahu in 1998. Halevy was a cerebral spymaster who had developed a personal understanding of Iran when he had made secret visits to that country during the rule of the Shah. "Sensible Iranians are not in short supply," Halevy noted after leaving the Mossad, reflecting his personal preference for a "sophisticated and nuanced" policy toward Iran's nuclear ambitions which, the former Mossad director believed, were "deterrable." Halevy's approach toward dealing with the Iranian nuclear program was to pursue a combination of economic and diplomatic pressure that would isolate the radicals and appeal to the "national aspirations" of mainstream Iranians.

Sharon grew tired of the quiet, measured approach taken by Halevy toward Iran, and went looking for someone "with a dagger between his teeth" to lead the spy agency. His choice was Meir Dagan, a retired army commando with a reputation for getting the job done, whatever the cost. As a junior officer, Dagan had served under the command of Ariel Sharon, where he earned the respect of the flamboyant general. Like Halevy, Dagan was not a proponent of military conflict with Iran, believing that it was Mossad's responsibility to keep Israel out of a war by aggressively carrying out its own work. Dagan took over in September 2002, and quickly streamlined the Mossad's mission focus to two main isues: terrorism (as defined by Israel, including Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) and the iranian nuclear problem.

By January 2003, Dagan's deputy, Tamir Pardo, had put together a detailed operational plan on how to proceed against Iran. The goal of the Mossad operation was to put in place a multi-faceted program of pressure on the regime in Tehran which would make the cost of continuing a nuclear program prohibitively high. Dagan realized that a war with Iran was not an option—Iran was too big, too powerful, and too far away for Israel to have any chance of destroying its nuclear program through military action. So methods short of war would have to be employed. To accomplish this, the Mossad envisioned a five-pronged approach based on diplomatic pressure, stringent economic sanctions, supporting opposition groups to undermine/overthrow the ruling theocracy, disrupting the importation by Iran of essential material and equipment, and covert operations designed to sabotage Iranian nuclear installations and, if needed, to assassinate key Iranian figures involved in the nuclear program.

– Pages 99-101